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1. Introduction
The Westminster election in Northern Ireland attracted more interest beyond the
region than is normally the case. This was not because of healthy new attention
being paid to the polity’s regular communal (to critics, sectarian) bloc headcount.
Rather, it was because the contest’s outcome might influence the formation of a mi-
nority government at Westminster. This possibility was actively discussed even into
election night results programmes, after the exit poll predicted the Conservatives to
fall just short of an overall majority, with 316 seats. As that seat tally rose, Northern
Ireland’s election slid back to its default positions of obscurity and parochial com-
munalism. Religious community background remained easily the most important
voting determinant. Unionist electoral pacts in four constituencies heightened
the prevailing sense of a traditional Orange versus Green contest, one in which
the Alliance Party, aligned to neither bloc, lost its solitary representative. Turnout
was a very modest 58%, well below the UK average. Only Sinn Fein, the Social
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Alliance contested all 18 constituencies.
Nonetheless, the contest was not entirely bereft of interest. There were significant
arguments over a disparate array of topics ranging from welfare reform to that of
same-sex marriage, still banned in Northern Ireland. Four seats changed hands
and the once-dominant Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) recovered some recent lost
ground to regain Westminster representation.
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2. The results
Table 8.1 indicates party fortunes in the contest. As has been the case since the 2001
election, Sinn Fein dominated the Nationalist bloc vote, the party’s share being
63.8%, compared with the SDLP’s 36.2%. Equally predictably, the Democratic
Unionist Party (DUP) maintained its lead over the UUP evident at the previous
two Westminster elections, this time by 61.6% to 38.4%.
As can be seen, changes in party vote shares were modest. As might be expected,
there was a very strong relationship between party performance in 2010 and that in
2015 as Table 8.2 shows.
The results marked a significant upturn in fortunes for the UUP, a ‘positive joy’ for
the leader since 2012, Mike Nesbitt, who had prioritised a return of his party to West-
minster.1 The UUP had suffered catastrophic reverses to the DUP in 2005 and its only
MP, Lady Sylvia Hermon, quit in disgust prior to the 2010 election over the bizarre
alliance with the Conservatives. Tentative signs of revival emerged in the 2014 local
elections and the capture of two parliamentary seats in 2015 exceeded expectations.
The party’s hopes centred mainly upon taking ultra-marginal Fermanagh and South
Tyrone from Sinn Fein, one of four constituencies where electoral pacts between the
DUP and UUP were agreed. The DUP stood aside for the UUP in Fermanagh and
South Tyrone and Newry and Armagh, a deal reciprocated by the UUP in Belfast
East and Belfast North. The pact arrangement was derided as bad politics that
turned off ordisenfranchised the electorate. Yet turnout increased in all fourconstitu-
encies in which the pacts operated, by an average of 3.5%. Only four of the other 14
constituencies recorded an increase in turnout. The electoral arrangement was also
criticised as a skewed deal favouring the DUP; or as a pact which would not work,
Table 8.1 Party vote and seat shares in Northern Ireland, 2015Westminster election
Seats Change in
seats
Votes % of votes Change in % share
from 2010
DUP 8 0 184,260 25.7 +0.7
Sinn Fein 4 21 176,232 24.5 21.0
SDLP 3 0 99,809 13.9 22.6
UUP 2 +2 114,935 16.0 +0.8
Independent 1 0 17,689 2.5 20.1
Alliance 0 21 61,556 8.6 +2.2
TUV 0 0 16,538 2.3 21.6
Conservative 0 0 9,055 1.3 N/Aa
Green 0 0 6,822 1.0 +0.5
aThe Conservatives held an electoral alliance with the Ulster Unionist Party in 2010.
1Irish Times, 9 May 2015, ‘Revitalised UUP Get Most from Night of Mixed Fortunes’, p. 5.
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although more perceptive commentators acknowledged the potential for both
parties.2
The deal worked extremely well for both forces, allowing the DUP to recapture
East Belfast and retain the key seat of North Belfast. Had the UUP polled at its 2010
level in East Belfast, rather than stepping aside, Alliance would have retained the
seat. If the DUP had lost votes to the UUP in North Belfast and the SDLP had
stood aside for its Nationalist rival, the seat would have been taken by Sinn Fein.
A unified communal headcount worked for the DUP in North Belfast amid what
its victorious candidate, Nigel Dodds, claimed was ‘one of the nastiest campaigns
I have been involved in’.3 From fearing the elimination of parliamentary represen-
tation in Belfast, Unionists again held half of the city’s four seats. In Fermanagh and
South Tyrone in 2010, although a solitary Unionist candidate (standing, oddly and
nominally, as an independent) had stood, the Unionist campaign had been lack-
lustre. Amid greater Unionist unity, a more prominent candidate (Tom Elliot
was a former UUP leader) and weaknesses in Sinn Fein’s defence of the seat, the
UUP defied expectations and overturned the slender republican majority of
four. The UUP’s other gain was not pact-dependent, a 3% swing in South Antrim
allowing the party to recapture a seat lost to the DUP in the calamitous election of
2005. Whilst the UUP’s revival should not be exaggerated, in that its vote share
rose by less than 1% in both the 2014 local and 2015 General Elections, the
party had restored its credibility as an alternative for relatively moderate Union-
ists still somewhat DUP-adverse. Table 8.3 provides the party vote shares in
individual constituencies.
Average turnout in majority Protestant constituencies was 55.7% and in major-
ity Catholic constituencies 60.5%, maintaining a differential, but one that has been
reduced in recent elections, having been as high as 11% as recently as 2005 (North
and South Belfast are excluded from the 2015 tallies as their populations are almost
Table 8.2 Correlations between 2010 and 2015Westminster election vote at constituency level
2015 DUP (2010) UCUNF (2010) Alliance (2010) SDLP (2010) SF (2010)
DUP (16) .942 (17)
UUP (15) .736 (17)
Alliance (18) .957 (18)
SDLP (18) .931 (18)
SF (18) .959 (17)
The figures in brackets represent the number of constituencies contested.
2See as an example of a more judicious analysis, Alex Kane’s view at http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/
analysis-great-deal-for-the-dup-but-nesbitt-could-still-be-a-winner-1-6641211 on 19 March 2015.
3Irish Times, 9 May 2015, p. 5.
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Table 8.3 Northern Ireland constituency results, 2015 Westminster election (% of vote)
Result DUP UUP Alliance Sinn
Fein
SDLP Oth Turnout Turnout
change
from 2010
% Swing
from 2010
Belfast E DUP gain from
Alliance
49.3 – 42.8 2.1 0.3 2.7 62.8 +3.9 5.5 Alliance
to DUP
Belfast N DUP hold 47.0 – 7.2 33.9 8.2 3.6 59.2 +2.7 1.6 SDLP to SF
Belfast S SDLP hold 22.2 9.1 17.2 13.9 24.5 13.0 60.0 +2.6 3.4 UUP to DUP
Belfast W SF hold 7.9 3.1 1.8 54.2 9.8 23.2 56.4 +2.4 –
East Antrim DUP hold 36.1 18.8 15.0 6.9 4.9 18.3 53.3 +2.7 2.5 DUP to UUP
East Londonderry DUP hold 42.2 15.4 7.6 19.8 12.3 2.7 51.9 23.4 4.0 UUP to DUP
Fermanagh & S Tyrone UUP gain
from SF
– 46.4 1.3 45.4 5.4 1.5 72.6 +3.6 1.1 SDLP to SF
Foyle SDLP hold 12.4 3.3 2.3 31.6 47.9 2.6 52.8 24.7 1.8 SF to SDLP
Lagan Valley DUP hold 47.9 15.2 13.9 2.9 6.3 13.8 55.9 20.5 2.0 UUP to DUP
Mid Ulster SF hold 13.4 15.4 1.9 48.7 12.4 8.2 60.3 22.9 0.7 SF to SDLP
Newry & Armagh SF hold – 32.7 1.7 41.1 24.1 0.4 64.3 +3.8 0.8 SF to SDLP
North Antrim DUP hold 43.2 12.1 5.6 12.3 7.0 19.9 55.2 22.6 –
North Down IND hold 23.6 – 8.6 0.8 1.0 IND 49.2,
OTH, 16.8
56.0 20.8 –
South Antrim UUP gain
from DUP
30.1 32.7 9.8 12.9 8.2 6.3 54.2 +0.2 3.0 DUP to UUP
South Down SDLP hold 8.2 9.3 3.8 28.5 42.3 7.9 56.8 23.4 2.0 SDLP to SF
Strangford DUP hold 44.4 14.4 13.8 2.6 6.9 18.0 52.8 20.9 6.0 UUP to DUP
Upper Bann DUP hold 32.7 27.9 3.8 24.5 9.0 2.1 59.0 +3.6 1.7 DUP to UUP
West Tyrone SF hold 17.5 15.9 2.2 43.5 16.7 4.3 60.5 20.4 3.8 SF to SDLP
Note: The strong second places for People Before Profit, with 19.2% of the vote in West Belfast and Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), with 15.7% of the vote in North Antrim,
render the concept of swing nebulous in those constituencies. In North Down, the DUP did not contest the seat in 2010, so, again, swing is meaningless.
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equally religiously mixed). There was little indication of an appetite for Westmin-
ster parties to field election candidates if the performance of the Conservative Party
is any guide. Although they contested every seat except Fermanagh and South
Tyrone and Belfast North, the Conservatives averaged only 1.3% of the vote and
even their best performance, 4.4% in North Down, was deposit-losing.
Sectarian headcounting, for so long the dominant theme of Northern Ireland’s
elections, showed no sign of dissipating. Table 8.4 indicates the Unionist and
Nationalist bloc voting figures. The relationship in each constituency between Prot-
estant and Catholic community background percentages and Unionist or Nationalist
bloc voting is then depicted in Figures 8.1 and 8.2.
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 plot the relationships between the percentage of Protestants
in a constituency and the Unionist vote and likewise between the percentage of
Catholics and the Nationalist vote. On the Unionist side, a plethora of parties
make up that combined vote; the DUP, UUP, TUV, UKIP and the Conservatives,
plus the support for the Independent Unionist, Sylvia Hermon. On the Nation-
alist side, the position is much more straightforward, a simple aggregate of the
votes for Sinn Fein and the SDLP.
The correlations between the percentage Protestant population and Unionist
vote and between the percentage Catholic population and Nationalist vote
remain remarkably strong, virtually unchanged from the previous election. They
are shown in Table 8.5.
Only East Belfast provided a significant outlier in terms of Unionist bloc voting,
with a strong Alliance performance in an overwhelmingly Protestant constituency.
If this outlier is removed, the Protestant–Unionist correlation moves to 0.980.
West Belfast provides something of an outlier on the Nationalist side, given
the strong performance of People Before Profit, which diminished the overall
Nationalist vote by nearly one-quarter from 2010 and helped to ensure that the
Nationalist bloc vote was less than two-thirds of votes cast, in a four-fifths Catholic
constituency.
3. The campaign within Unionism
The DUP’s campaign focused upon retaking East Belfast from Alliance. Consider-
able hostility from the DUP towards its centrist rival had been evident since Naomi
Long’s success in 2010 over the DUP leader, Peter Robinson, in a seat held by the
DUP since 1979. This opprobrium increased markedly after Alliance’s decision
in December 2012 to support the Nationalist parties on Belfast city council in pre-
venting the Union flag being flown permanently from the city hall, in favour of
its display only on designated days. Alliance came under considerable pressure
from loyalist groups beyond the control of the DUP from thereon, with its East
Belfast office (and others) firebombed during the following 18 months. Alliance’s
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Table 8.4 Unionist, Nationalist and Non-Unionist/Non-Nationalist vote shares, 2015 Westminster election
Constituency Protestants Protestant % Total Unionist
Vote
Total Union-
ist %
R. Catholics R. Catholic % Nationalist
vote
Nationalist % No
religion
Turnout %
Belfast E 69,533 75.4 19,575 49.3 11,712 12.7 950 2.4 10.5 62.8
Belfast N 46,821 45.7 19,096 47.0 48,126 46.9 17,637 43.4 6.4 59.2
Belfast S 48,630 43.7 14,685 35.7 49,025 44.0 14,962 38.4 9.5 60.0
Belfast W 15,645 16.7 4660 13.2 75,263 80.1 22,638 64.1 2.7 56.4
East Antrim 63,148 70.1 24,523 73.2 18,362 20.4 3953 11.8 8.5 53.3
East Londonderry 53,097 53.3 20,418 58.8 41,564 41.7 11,127 32.1 4.4 51.9
Fermanagh &
S Tyrone
40,100 39.1 23,608 46.4 59,159 57.7 25,810 50.7 2.6 72.6
Foyle 22,193 22.0 6763 18.3 75,731 75.1 29,404 79.5 2.1 52.8
Lagan Valley 73,158 71.9 30,451 75.0 19,346 19.0 3644 9.2 8.1 55.9
Mid Ulster 30,522 30.8 14,658 35.8 66,152 66.7 24,990 61.1 2.1 60.3
Newry & Armagh 34,380 30.6 16,522 33.1 74,591 66.4 32,514 65.2 2.5 64.3
North Antrim 71,446 66.0 31,431 75.0 30,723 28.4 8068 19.3 4.8 55.2
North Down 66,618 74.4 28,344 83.3 11,269 12.6 628 1.8 11.8 56.0
South Antrim 59,349 59.8 25,258 69.6 31,619 31.9 7689 21.1 7.5 54.2
South Down 29,224 26.9 10,812 25.3 75,384 69.3 30,363 70.9 3.4 56.8
Strangford 65,353 73.1 26,026 76.7 15,447 17.3 3211 9.5 8.7 52.8
Upper Bann 58,998 50.0 28,797 61.0 51,919 44.0 15,831 33.5 5.1 59.0
West Tyrone 27,502 30.2 13,060 33.8 61,993 68.0 23,251 60.2 1.5 60.5
North Down’s MP, Sylvia Hermon, was re-elected as an Independent (she stood on the same label in 2010) but can be regarded as Unionist. She was formerly a UUP MP and was
not opposed by the UUP.
Source for religious composition of constituencies: Russell, R. (2013)Census 2011: Key Statistics atAssembly Area Level, Northern IrelandResearch and Information Service Information
Paper NIAR 161-13, accessed at http://www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2012/general/7013.pdf, on 17 May 2015.
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Figure 8.2 Nationalist constituency vote by Catholic population, 2010–2015
Table 8.5 Correlations between religious community background and Unionist or Nationalist
bloc vote, 2005–2015
2005 2010 2015
Catholic-Nationalist 0.975 0.987 0.985
Protestant-Unionist 0.974 0.943 0.919
Figure 8.1 Unionist constituency vote by Protestant population, 2010–2015
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consistent support for the Parades Commission’s determinations on the routes of
Orange marches, which had seen the North Belfast Twelfth of July return parade
stopped in 2013 and 2014, provoked DUP ire. Alliance’s backing for same-sex
marriage was also at odds with the DUP’s social conservatism. Robinson summarised
the DUP’s contempt for Alliance in his 2014 party conference speech, deriding the
‘flag-lowering, parade-stopping, gay marriage supporting, pro-water charging,
holier-than-thou Alliance Party’.4 Alliance’s Step Forward Not Back manifesto5 con-
tained a shared future vision (numbers in integrated schools were to double to 20%
by 2020 for example) but the party, whilst performing well, was always likely to strug-
gle to hold East Belfast against the combined forces of Unionism.
For the DUP, the recovery of East Belfast offered the prospect of additional
strength through size in any post-election negotiations. The unexpected loss of
South Antrim neutered the gain but the DUP ended the election as it had begun,
as the fourth largest party at Westminster, a position now shared by the much-
reduced Liberal Democrats. In anticipation of a possible role of kingmaker in gov-
ernment formation, the DUP, unlike the other smaller parties (with the exception
of the Liberal Democrats), was careful to keep open the possibility of doing busi-
ness with the Conservatives or Labour, although the party’s members favoured
the Conservatives by a ratio of seven-to-one over Labour and placed themselves
considerably right-of-centre.6 The Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, cautioned
against a ‘Blukip alliance’ of the Conservatives, UKIP and the DUP, a ‘right-wing
alliance that brings together people who don’t believe in climate change; who
reject gay rights; who want the death penalty back and people who want to
scrap human rights legislation’.7 Amid the extensive television coverage afforded
to smaller parties, notably in the leaders’ and challengers’ debates, the DUP pro-
tested at its exclusion (justified by broadcasters due to Northern Ireland’s dis-
tinct party system) and demanded a Royal Commission to explore the future
of the BBC.
Beyond the BBC criticism, the DUP outlined clearly what it wanted from a
future UK Government. The shopping list included a demand to keep defence
spending at 2% of GDP; EU treaty change to give the UK greater control over im-
migration and the removal of the ‘spare room subsidy’, more commonly known as
4Peter Robinson, Speech to DUP party conference, La Mon Hotel Belfast, 22 November 2014, accessed
at http://www.mydup.com/news/article/conference-2014-leaders-speech-rt-hon-peter-robinson-mla on
22 May 2015.
5Alliance Party (2015) Step ForwardNot Back: Alliance Party 2015Westminster electionmanifesto, Belfast,
Alliance Party.
6Tonge, J., Braniff, M., Hennessey, T., McAuley, J. and Whiting, S. (2014)TheDemocratic Unionist Party:
From Protest to Power, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
7‘DUP Part of Right-wing Threat Warns Clegg’, Irish News, 17 April 2015, p. 10.
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the ‘bedroom tax’, even though it had not been extended to Northern Ireland
anyway. The DUP’s traditional line on being right-wing on security and constitu-
tional issues but, cognisant of a working-class support base, more centre-left on
economic issues, was a useful outlook in promoting equidistance between the
main Westminster parties. Local issues of importance, such as parade routes and
flags, were kept hidden from view in terms of possible leverage.
Similar to the DUP, the UUP did not offer preferment for the Conservatives or
Labour. The UUP manifesto also bore many similarities to that offered by the DUP,
particularly regarding a reduction in corporation tax and greater local financial
control, adding demands for VAT cuts for property repairs and the hospitality in-
dustry and extra funding for mental health.8 The party claimed the extra economic
activity engendered by its tax reductions would be worth £1.4 billion against a
diminished take of £500 million. The UUP’s proposals for integrated education
from the age of four did not differ markedly from those of Alliance.
4. The campaign within nationalism
With the party’s focus seemingly upon the elections to the Irish Parliament and
the Northern Ireland Assembly in 2016, the centenary of the Easter Rising,
Sinn Fein’s Westminster campaign was lacklustre. It was even marked by very
unusual public criticism from within, following the publication of an election
leaflet promoting Gerry Kelly’s candidature in marginal North Belfast. This was
the constituency where most Troubles killings occurred (577) and where sectar-
ianism remained rawest.9 Attempting to unseat the DUP’s Westminster leader,
Nigel Dodds, Kelly’s leaflet lacked subtlety, in deploying a pie chart showing the per-
centage of Catholics (46.94) and Protestants (45.67) in the constituency, taken from
the 2011 census. Voters were urged, on the basis of the Catholic majority, to elect the
Sinn Fein candidate to ‘Make the Change, Make History’. The figures represented
the entire constituency population, but the adult demography was somewhat dif-
ferent, with Protestant adults still holding a slight majority. Aided by the Unionist
electoral pact and splitting of the Nationalist vote between Kelly and the SDLP can-
didate, the DUP comfortably held the seat. Whilst any Unionist outrage might be
dismissed as faux and synthetic, given Northern Ireland’s existence on the basis of a
similar headcount, more significant criticism of Sinn Fein’s leaflet came from an un-
likely source—two of its own members, who publicly denounced the leaflet as an
8Ulster Unionist Party (2015) One Day, One Vote, One Chance for Change: Ulster Unionist Party Election
Manifesto, Belfast: UUP accessed at http://uup.org/assets/images/uup%20ge%20manifesto.pdf, on 22
May 2015.
9Accessed at http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/general-election-2015/battle-for-north-belfast-
getting-vote-out-is-key-to-dodds-reelection-for-dup-31148874.html on 12 May 2015.
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‘absolute disgrace’ and the ‘very antithesis of what republicanism represents at
its core’.10
Beyond the communal counting, the main thrust of Sinn Fein’s election cam-
paign lay in the opposition to the welfare reforms being introduced at Stormont.
The party had appeared to accept the UK Government’s financial package offered
in the Stormont House Agreement in December 2014 and supported the subse-
quent preliminary legislation. The deal comprised ‘£650 m of new and additional
funding; flexibilities that protect £900 m of resource spending (normally ring
fenced for capital) and additional capital borrowing of up to £350 m’ with the
promise that a £114 million ‘fine’ for the failure to complete welfare reform on
time be reduced if completed during 2015–2016.11 It was lauded in the Conserva-
tive Party manifesto as ‘a deal to help ensure that politics works, the economy grows
and society is more cohesive and united’.12
Having appeared to acquiesce to the arrangements, Sinn Fein followed its March
2015 ard-fheis in Derry, at which the proposals had attracted minimal disquiet, by
rejecting the plans and then continuing to oppose proposed Conservative welfare
and service cuts during and beyond the campaign, voting down the passage of
the welfare reform bill three weeks after the election and reviving uncertainty
over the political institutions. The party demanded the reinstatement of £1.5
billion which it claimed had been cut from Northern Ireland’s block grant whilst ad-
vocating the devolution of powers of income tax, national insurance to the region
and capital gains tax, as well as the power to set the minimum wage and end zero
hours contracts. Whilst the precise timing of Sinn Fein’s apparent u-turn was
odd, the party was keen to establish its anti-austerity credentials. Critics had
accused Sinn Fein of opposing austerity in the Irish Republic at the same time as pre-
siding over its implementation in the North. By now moving against welfare cuts in
Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein diminished the legitimacy of the charge.
Beyond the financial issues, Sinn Fein reiterated longstanding demands for a bill
of rights and an Irish Language Act remained, whilst the party also advocated
gender quotas for election candidates.13 Sinn Fein’s advocacy of a united Ireland
was expressed via a continuing commitment to a border poll on Irish unity
although it remained unclear whether it would be a North only plebiscite—in
10Accessed at http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/election-diary-sf-rising-star-savages-kelly-
s-sectarian-leaflet-1-6723815 on 4 May 2015.
11HM Government, ‘UK Government Financial Package to Northern Ireland’, accessed at https://www.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/390673/Stormont_House_
Agreement_Financial_Annex.pdf on 21 May 2015, p. 1.
12Conservative Party (2015) Strong Leadership: A Clear Economic Plan: A Brighter, More Secure Future:
The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, London, Conservative Party, p. 69.
13Martin McGuinness, ‘Standing up to the Tories’, Irish News, 28 April 2015, p. 11.
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the gift of the British Secretary of State, certain to result in a no vote and more likely
to harm the republican cause—or an all-island vote via the two jurisdictions, the
latter a potentially interesting expression of sentiment regardless of the seeming im-
possibility of implementation. Amid talk of a hung Westminster Parliament, Sinn
Fein’s policy of abstention came under scrutiny. Any possibility of the party taking
their seats in a British Parliament was robustly denied by Sinn Fein’s Deputy First
Minister and by the national chairman, Declan Kearney, the former adamant
that it remained a matter of ‘principle’ and the latter stating that Sinn Fein would
‘never’ take their seats. Given the denials, which preceded entry into Dail Eireann
and the Northern Ireland Assembly, the degree of credence to be afforded such pro-
testations was open to debate, but nonetheless it was apparent that there was no
movement on the subject at the present time within Sinn Fein.
The eclectic range of ‘dissident’ republicans long disillusioned with Sinn Fein’s
compromises may have been particularly sceptical about Sinn Fein’s abstentionist
pledge. The political dissidents had enjoyed a few modest local election successes in
2014, one even topping the poll in Derry. The paramilitary aspect of dissidence
remained active and was evident in attempted bombings and death threats during
the General Election campaign. The dissidents were regarded as ‘still a threat’ even if
their campaign was dismissed as ‘going nowhere’ by the main Nationalist news-
paper.14 The year prior to the beginning of the election campaign had witnessed
three deaths related to the security situation, 73 shootings and 36 bombing inci-
dents, with 35 people charged (from 227 arrests) under the Prevention of Terrorism
Act.15 Over the five years since the last Westminster election campaign, there had
been 634 shooting and bombing incidents and eight deaths. This was small-scale
compared with the Troubles, but the peace remained imperfect.
SDLP policy for Northern Ireland did not differ markedly from that offered by
Sinn Fein, nor did the campaign, which was also ‘anti-austerity’. The SDLP empha-
sised how it had regularly tabled amendments to bills in the Northern Ireland
Assembly that had been defeated by the DUP and Sinn Fein. Yet, whilst going
into formal opposition in the Assembly remained an option for the SDLP, it was
difficult to see how this alone could restore the party’s fortunes. The SDLP sup-
ported greater devolution of fiscal powers and placed particular emphasis upon
the need for tourism VAT to be reduced to 5% to grow the number of visitors. In
pledging to form a ‘Celtic coalition’ with the SNP and Plaid Cymru, the SDLP
14See, for example, the editorials in the Irish News: ‘Dissidents Still a Threat’, Irish News, 23 April 2015
and ‘Dissidents Put Lives At Risk’, Irish News, 29 April 2015.
15Police Service of Northern Ireland (2015) ‘Security Situation Statistics 2014–15’, Belfast, PSNI,
accessed at http://www.psni.police.uk/annual_security_situation_statistics_report_2014-15.pdf on
22 May 2015, pp. 2–4.
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criticised the ‘silent partners’ of Sinn Fein, absent from Westminster.16 Only four
months after supporting the Stormont House Agreement, the SDLP grandly
pledged to negotiate a ‘New Economic Accord with Westminster’.17 The party’s
comfortable defence of its three seats did not assuage the desire for a change of per-
sonnel at the helm. Within one week of the election, the former leader Mark Durkan
and former deputy leaders Seamus Mallon and Brid Rodgers had called for Alasdair
McDonnell to stand down.18 Amid geographical confinement, another shrunken
vote share and the perception of better ideas, days and leaders behind it, the
SDLP’s long slow decline continued.
5. Social conservatism and the moral agenda
A feature of the election campaign was the debate over social conservatism.
Same-sex marriage became one of the most discussed topics. The referendum cam-
paign in the Irish Republic on the issue, which saw a decisive endorsement (by a near
two-to-one margin) of same-sex marriage, was already underway when the election
in Northern Ireland took place. The DUP remained firmly opposed to revising the
traditional terms of marriage. The party had already blocked the attempted intro-
duction of same-sex marriage three times via the introduction of Petitions of
Concern in the Northern Ireland Assembly. In addition, DUP ministers had
opposed blood donations from gays and adoption by gay couples.
After the election the DUP leader allowed his Assembly members (MLAs) to vote
with their conscience rather than a party whip on issues such as gay marriage and
abortion, but the net effect would be the same. The UUP already allowed its MLAs
a free vote on same-sex marriage, but onlyone voted in favourof the change,although
he (Danny Kinahan) found it no barrier to his election to Westminster in 2015. The
DUP was also prominent in backing the Christian bakery, Ashers, which had declined
to bake a cake with a slogan supporting gay marriage. Shortly after the election the
bakery lost the case, being found to have discriminated against its customer. The
DUP promised a ‘conscience clause’ bill protecting individuals against having to
act against their religious beliefs, although any legislative proposals appeared
certain to flounder against the requirement for cross-community support.
For some within the DUP (but not the leadership) social conservatism offers the
prospect of electoral outreach to Catholic conservatives.19 Yet this seems unlikely to
16Alasdair McDonnell, ‘Time to Choose a Better Way’, Irish News, 29 April 2015.
17Social Democratic and Labour Party (2015) Prosperity Not Austerity: Westminster Manifesto 2015,
Belfast, SDLP.
18Irish News, ‘Durkan; SDLP Needs Change in Leadership’, Irish News, 15 May 2015, p. 4.
19See, for example, the comments of the former minister, Edwin Poots, in Tonge et al, The Democratic
Unionist Party, op cit. p. 182.
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yield much dividend amid an electorate still polarised amid by communal division
in terms of voting patterns. Moreover, that conservative Catholic constituency is
diminishing in size as liberal views spread and it is doubtful that even less socially
liberal older Catholics, having endured decades of anti-Catholicism from the
DUP’s founder, could ever be persuaded to consider the DUP as a viable voting
proposition. During the election campaign, the DUP leadership was keener to
show the party as a modern force than an organisation rooted in biblical certainties.
As the Unionist newspaper, the News Letter noted of the DUP’s view of homosexu-
ality, the party’s strategy was to avoid the question altogether.20 Same-sex marriage
and abortion were subjects entirely omitted from the DUP’s 32-page election mani-
festo. The DUP leadership also took care to also omit any mention of such items
from its requirements of a future British Government. Obviously these ‘moral’
issues were devolved items (as re-affirmed at the time of the 2006 St Andrews Agree-
ment when many members insisted the regional opt-out was crucial), so there was
no particular reason for the DUP to raise them as bargaining chips. However, their
omission was also a product of the DUP leadership’s desire to do nothing to deter
the potential suitors of its own ‘civil partnership’—the Conservative or Labour
leaderships—from courtship in the event of a hung Parliament. David Cameron
made his distaste clear: ‘I totally disagree with the DUP about this issue’,21 whilst
not closing off any post-election deal options.
The DUP leadership’s desire to keep same-sex marriage discussions off topic was
soon blown off course by the comments of the party’s Northern Ireland Executive
Health Minister, Jim Wells, at a hustings three weeks before the election. Located
very much within the religiously devoted Free Presbyterian wing of the party,
Wells allegedly claimed that the children of gay couples were far more likely to be
abused or neglected.22 Although he subsequently apologised, Wells was also
involved in controversy over alleged criticism of a lesbian couple’s lifestyle and he
resigned from office. Debates over same-sex marriage featured in the subsequent
televised debates between the party leaders.
Yet despite the furore, Wells’ comments were unlikely to dissuade the DUP vote.
Of more significance was the gradually changing internal party dynamic, imper-
ceptible to those unwilling to take a closer look. One perceptive commentator
was correct in arguing, against the flow, that ‘just beneath the surface, the DUP is
20Sam McBride, ‘Analysis: DUP Strategy to Avoid Moral Issues in Disarray, accessed at http://www.
newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/analysis-dup-strategy-to-avoid-moral-issues-in-disarray-1-6712551
on 28 April 2015.
21Irish News, ‘Cameron Refuses to Rule Out a DUP coalition’, 23 April 2015, p. 8.
22Accessed at http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/health-minister-apologises-for-gay-marriage-
child-abuse-remark-1-6707479 on 24 April 2015.
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changing’.23 Whilst the Free Presbyterians, for whom the DUP was a vehicle for poli-
ticised Protestantism, remain the largest single denomination within the party, very
few have joined in the last two decades and the party will gradually come to reflect a
more ‘normal’ distribution of Protestant denominations. This change will also be
facilitated by the influx of more socially liberal former UUP members who
entered the party after the Good Friday Agreement. The DUP will hardly overnight
become a liberal and secular entity—the current leader believes strongly in faith-
derived politics informing his party.24 The legacy of Paisleyism remains strong
even if the influence of Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church wanes. Nonetheless,
the party is undergoing change and has come some distance from the views of,
for example, former senior DUP figures such as the Reverend Ivan Foster, who,
in April 2015, criticised the DUP for softening its stance on the ‘vile sin’ of homo-
sexuality since the days when the party was at the forefront of the ‘Save Ulster from
Sodomy’ campaign of the 1970s.25
Sinn Fein had brought proposals for marriage equality before the Assembly on
three occasions prior to the election and pledged to continue reform the existing law
in the party’s manifesto.26 During the Westminster election the party was cam-
paigning simultaneously and successfully for a Yes vote for same-sex marriage in
the Irish Republic. The SDLP also offered support for same-sex marriage, although
five of the party’s 14 Assembly members did not vote in the 2015 debate on the issue.
The SDLP could fairly point out it was not alone in its divisions, given that Alliance,
which strongly trumpeted its support for change, found three of its eight members
abstaining on the same-sex marriage bill. The SDLP also took a hard line on abor-
tion, party leader McDonnell opposing a softening of the law even in cases of lethal
foetal abnormality.
Overall, the debate over social conservatism amounted to a political contest
which did not replace the old Orange versus Green paradigm, but, on same-sex
marriage at least, tended to replicate divisions. The Protestant and Unionist wing
continued to advocate traditional social values, still more overtly on the DUP
side, although even that party will thaw in due course. Both of the main Unionist
23Sam McBride, ‘Analysis: It Might Not Look Like It But the DUP is Changing’, accessed at http://www.
newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/analysis-it-might-not-look-like-it-but-the-dup-is-changing-1-6709299
on 25 April 2015.
24The current leader, Peter Robinson, insists that on a 0–10 scale where 0 equals no faith influence and 10
equals the maximum influence upon a party, faith should equal 10, but should not be derived from a
particular church. See Tonge, J. et al. The Democratic Unionist Party, op cit.
25Accessed at http://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/regional/dup-soft-on-vile-sin-of-homosexuality-
foster-1-6712547 on 12 May 2015.
26Sinn Fein (2015) Equality Not Austerity. 2015 Westminster Election Manifesto, Belfast: Sinn Fein,
accessed at http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/34582 on 5 May 2015.
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parties regarded the issues as matters of conscience rather than formal party posi-
tions by 2015, although the DUP was still seen as a party hostile to change. In the
centre, Alliance’s support for same-sex marriage offered a clear choice for liberal
Unionists who rejected the DUP’s fusion of politics with a particular moral view.
The Green Nationalist side also retained some of its longstanding social conserva-
tism (which even Sinn Fein’s left turn of the 1980s had not entirely sidelined) but
this was largely on the abortion issue, with neither of the two Nationalist parties
advocating a loosening of abortion legislation on the scale of the 1967 Abortion
Act elsewhere in the UK, even allowing for Sinn Fein’s avowed ‘pro-choice’
stance. However, Sinn Fein’s strong support for same-sex marriage, a position
backed by most of the SDLP, marked a significant contrast with Unionist positions.
6. Conclusion
The election amply demonstrated how the linkage between religious community
background and voting patterns remains the strongest in Europe. For all that suc-
cessive surveys indicate that the largest category of electors is that eschewing Union-
ist or Nationalist labels, this category is very much a minority voter species at
election time. Although enjoying a modest vote rise in this contest, the main
party declining alignment to either bloc, Alliance, has never achieved a percentage
vote share in double figures at any Westminster election—and it was fighting its
eleventh such contest. One assessment of the election asserted that ‘there are a lot
of shy Unionists and pro-Union supporters out there . . . maybe a bit embarrassed
by some aspects and manifestations of unionism and loyalism’.27 Nonetheless, it is
Unionists and Nationalists who show up at the polls, to cast votes for ‘their’
ideological parties.
Other issues beyond the old inter-communal attachments were important in the
election, although how Northern Ireland’s representation might affect the parlia-
mentary arithmetic at Westminster often overshadowed local policy discussions.
Welfare reform figured prominently and the extent of devolution to Northern
Ireland, particularly in respect of its (lack of) fiscal autonomy, was also a con-
cern. There was consensus across the divide on the need for improved public ser-
vices and strong support for harmonisation of corporation tax across Ireland,
meaning a substantial reduction in the North.
Religiously derived issues featured in the campaign to an unusual extent.
Amongst the main parties, support for same-sex marriage was offered by Sinn
Fein, Alliance and the SDLP and opposed by the DUP (the UUP remained
neutral although most of its elected representatives opposed the idea). Whilst
moral issues such as same-sex marriage and abortion potentially provide electoral
27Alex Kane, ‘Unionism Was Overall Winner in the Election’, Irish News, 15 May 2015, p. 21.
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reconfigurations and new divides between social conservatives and ‘progressives’,
the old Orange versus Green affiliations remain paramount and, if anything tend
to be replicated via a Unionist social conservatism versus a Nationalist greater pro-
gressivism or liberalism faultline, although this division is far from absolute. There
is likely to be considerable pressure placed upon the DUP and UUPon the same-sex
marriage over the next few years, provoking arguments on different aspects of
the issue. These go beyond the actual merit of rival positions on the issue and
into consideration of, first, the isolation of Northern Ireland in comparison to
the Irish Republic and the remainder of the UK, versus respect for the principles
of devolved self-government and second, the relative merits of any court challenge
against the democratic mandate of the DUP and UUP to resist change. Cultural
wars have been dominated by the Orange-Green contests of parades and symbols
since the Good Friday Agreement, but over the next few years the socio-moral
arena will also be significant.
A large swathe of the electorate remains unattached to traditional Unionist or
Nationalist labels and declares as non-aligned. However, this sizeable section
remains less likely to vote than the ideological identifiers, making Northern
Ireland elections continuing contests of mainly true believers. As for the intra-bloc
contests, they merely highlighted what these election volumes have been previously
asserting. There is electoral space, in the form of a substantial mildly Protestant and
moderately Unionist middle-class, for the UUP to revive, as the party continues its
organisational improvements. Re-entry to Westminster fulfilled one of the UUP’s
immediate strategic objectives. For the SDLP, there is less electoral space to recover
and the crises of leadership and organisation meant a further loss of vote share,
even in an election in which a somewhat distracted Sinn Fein did not perform
particularly well.
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